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The influence of Unions on CSR: is there a trade-off between 
employee-oriented and non-employee-oriented policies?
Word count: 10788
Abstract
Strategic managers are consistently faced with decisions of how to allocate a company’s 
scarce resources to meet the demands of shareholders and other powerful and legimate 
stakeholders.  This paper analyses whether higher union density at company level pushes 
management to engage more in CSR. Drawing from stakeholder theory and the resource 
allocation approach of CSR as well as union voice and monopoly models, this paper finds that 
companies have to substitute non-employee-oriented CSR with employee-oriented CSR as 
union density increases but is still at low levels. At higher levels of union density, companies can 
complement both types of CSR. This perhaps represents a reinforcement of mutual interests 
between management and organised labour, which has implications for managerial 
prerogatives as well as union positioning in the labour and political process. 
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Unions, Stakeholder theory  
1  Introduction
 The spread of voluntary corporate initiatives in the environmental, social, and 
governance domains - commonly referred to as “corporate social responsibility (CSR)” - can be 
attributed to increased institutional and social pressures for ethical, responsible, and sustainable 
business practices (Carroll, 1979; Aupperle, 1991; Campbell, 2007; Waddock, 2008). Firms can 
respond to such pressures by taking actions that are visible and directly related to its external 
stakeholders (e.g suppliers, consumers) via better disclosure practices, branding, low 
involvement with ‘sinful’ industries, and improved product quality control. They can also take 
actions that are most salient to internal stakeholders (e.g. employees). Such actions can be in the 
form of setting up conditions and work environments that foster health and safety. The scope of 
CSR activities that a company may undertake can, therefore, affect multiple stakeholders both 
inside  and outside the firm. 
The traditional boundary between internal and external stakeholders is based on the level 
of direct supervisory control that management has over the stakeholder.  However, as research 
points out, it is possible to manage external stakeholder relationships as well, making the 
distinctions blurred between internal and external stakeholders (Harrison and St. John, 1996).   
This paper distinguishes between internal and external stakeholders based on the three-
dimensional differences between insiders and outsiders by Fanelli and Misangyi (2006).  First, 
internal stakeholders are motivated by management to produce and maintain internal 
effectiveness whereas external stakeholders are motivated at arms’ length by management to 
participate in order to facilitate the firm’s activities via, for example, supplier contracts and 
consumer purchases.  Second, the relationship between internal stakeholders and management 
is hierarchical, while the relationship between outsiders and management is network-based.  
Third, management communication with internal stakeholders is captive, where the social 
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distance between the stakeholder and management does not impact the salience and effect of 
the communication from management.  With external stakeholders, management 
communication is more competitive, where management is competing with other firms and 
actors for the attention of the outsiders.   Mattingly and Berman (2006) also distinguishes 
corporate social action between technical stakeholders and institutional stakeholders.  
Employees are more closely associated with the technical environment of the firm based on 
resource exchanges between input (effort) and output (production) rather than the institutional 
environment of the firm, which governs the normative expectations from the firm.  They are, 
therefore, primarily technical internal stakeholders rather than instutional external stakeholders.  
Corporate social action towards employees would consist of elements different to corporate 
social action towards insitutional external stakeholders.
While a big section of the literature on CSR has been populated with studies that have 
related social performance to financial performance (see Margolis et al. (2007) for a meta 
analysis), there still remains a relative paucity of papers with regards to the influence of 
stakeholder demand on corporate supply of CSR. In other words, the particular stakeholder 
pressure that impacts CSR has not been well established. The gaps are both theoretical and 
empirical.  Consider, specifically, the case of employees as a stakeholder group. Do they have 
enough power internally - or can they draw sufficient attention to the company - such that their 
employment rights are upheld in the most suitable manner? Can they, as a stakeholder, pressure 
the company to mend and improve its health and safety procedures? Can they push the company 
to indulge in practices that are also beneficial to society and to the environment? 
The main theoretical focus of this paper is the influence of stakeholder pressure on 
corporate delivery of CSR. Stakeholder theory (e.g. Freeman, 1984) as well as the resource 
allocation approach of CSR based on slack resources theory  are the main driving factors from the 
supply side that guide this discussion. I take the view that companies want to meet the demands 
of their relevant stakeholders (consumers, suppliers, investors, employees) who have legitimacy, 
urgent needs and who have power vis-à-vis management. In particular, this paper looks at the 
role of trade unions in the British context. The British context of employment relations (in the 
private sector) probably offers the best setting to study this question because unions have not 
been eroded via anti-union legislation such as in the United States, and unions are not 
institutionalized such as in continental European countries. Instead, unions can (freely) organize 
bargaining units within individual firms (Metcalf, 2003; Hyman, 2010), and this allows for a 
comparison across time of the interplay between stakeholder (union) pressure and idiosyncratic 
corporate delivery of CSR. The underlying union frameworks that are used alongside the 
aforementioned theories are the union voice (Freeman and Medoff, 1984) and the union 
monopoly (power) models (e.g. Reynolds, 1981; Oswald, 1985).  These models are used from the 
stakeholder demand-side of CSR.
 To test the theoretical predictions, I use an originally-crafted dataset on CSR from 
SustainAlytics. Financial data are added from DataStream to create a longitudinal sample of firms 
listed on the FTSE100 index, one of the main market indices in the United Kingdom. Using fixed-
effects estimation techniques, this paper finds that higher union density is associated with more 
employee-oriented CSR. As union density rises, firms create more policies and programs that are 
geared towards improving employee relations. On the other hand, estimations show that the 
relationship between non-employee-oriented CSR and union density is more complex. At low 
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levels of unionization, as union density rises, companies have to “sacrifice” non-employee-
oriented CSR in order to meet the demands of unions. However, at higher levels of unionisation, 
firms are able to invest in policies and programs that are more directly related to external 
stakeholders as well as meet the demands of employees and unions. In other words, at low levels 
of unionization, companies have to substitute non-employee-oriented with employee-oriented 
CSR, but as unions become more entrenched, companies invest in both components of CSR in 
complementary fashion. 
 This paper makes at least three contributions to the literature on CSR and on the impact 
of stakeholders, in particular labor unions, on CSR profiles. First, from a theoretical point of view, 
although there have been many papers that have looked at institutional differences among 
countries leading to different CSR practices (e.g. Matten and Moon, 2008; Iaonnou and Serafeim, 
2012), there have been very few that have taken an inside look at the corporation, in particular 
with regards to the particular and sometimes conflicting demands of key internal and external 
stakeholders. In industrial relations, the literature is ripe in terms of the influence of unions on 
R&D (Hirsch, 1992), innovation (Bradley et al., 2015), and profitability and share value (Ruback 
and Zimmerman, 1984; Abowd, 1989; Lee and Mas, 2012). This paper, to the author’s knowledge, 
is the first to look at the influence of unions on corporate social responsibility. Second, this paper 
adds a layer of complexity not studied before in the comparative CSR literature. While most 
papers that deal with comparative CSR ignore within-country idiosyncratic company differences, 
this paper proposes that these differences are important and play a significant role in explaining 
individual company profiles of CSR. As such, future papers in the comparative CSR sphere could 
or should exploit these differences as well. Third, from an empirical perspective, this paper adds 
to a debate that has emerged in the literature about the substitutability or complementarity 
between internal and external CSR. On the one hand, Matten and Moon (2008) argues that there 
may be a substitution that is necessary between implicit elements of CSR (e.g. bounded by rules 
and regulations such as collective bargaining) and explicit elements (such as social community 
involvement and support). On the other hand, Gjolberg (2009) argues that they are 
complements. The findings of this paper, more robust and closer to the corporate stakeholder 
approach and not limited to using national proxies for collective bargaining strength, suggest that 
both are at play. At low levels of power exercised by internal stakeholders, substitution takes 
place, whereas at higher levels, there is complementarity. A finding which has interesting 
implications for management and perhaps union renewal debates. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the theoretical lenses 
through which union influence on CSR will be analyzed and develops some testable hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the data and methodology that will be used to test the hypotheses. Section 
4 details the results of the paper while Section 5 leads the discussions and concludes. 
2  Corporate Supply and Stakeholder Demand of CSR
 
 
With globalisation and continued demand from watchdog groups, amongst others, for 
companies to engage in and improve on a broad range of social activities, management is often 
faced with the strenuous task of allocating a company’s scarce resources in order to build 
shareholder value as well as earn goodwill from stakeholders.  The neo-classical view of allocating 
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resources to activities other than those that directly maximise shareholder returns is an agency 
loss (Friedman, 1970).  The strategic management literature has taken a more pluralistic view on 
the link between social activities and firm/shareholder profitability.  Several papers have been 
written to empirically demonstrate a link between social activities generated in a CSR setting and 
financial returns (e.g. Hillman and Keim, 2001, McWilliams and Siegel, 2001).  Given that the 
meta-analytic evidence from Margolis et al. (2007) yielded a modest positive relationship 
between social and financial performance at best, curvilinear relationships (e.g. Barnett and 
Salomon, 2006, 2012) have been proposed and tested, and mediating relationships have also 
been proposed and tested (Surroca et al. 2010).  With the link between CSR and financial 
performance being curvilinear and dependent on intervening variables, it begs the questions: 
why do companies engage in CSR and in what type of CSR do they engage?
While the purpose of this paper is not to examine all the reasons behind CSR engagement, 
I will focus on two elements: 1) instrumental stakeholder approach, and 2) resource allocation 
approach based on slack resources theory.   According to instrumental stakeholder theory 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995), when a firm develops a close and trusting relationship with a 
broad base of primary stakeholders, this leads to intangible benefits that generate competitive 
advantage for the firm.  As such, managing for stakeholders can lead to higher financial 
performance, which is beneficial to shareholder value as well (Harrison et al., 2010).  A key 
question here is: who are the stakeholders and to what extent can management meet all of their 
demands, particularly if these demands are contradictory and if they cause too high a strain on 
the company’s scarce resources?  To get a better comprehension of this, we refer to the resource 
allocation approach of CSR and to stakeholder salience theories.  The resource allocation 
approach of CSR (e.g. McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Waddock and Graves, 1997) suggests that 
when firms have to allocate slack resources emanating from higher financial returns, they will 
target CSR activities that are “ideal” to the firm given its size and position in the industry. Mackey 
et al. (2007) suggests that this allocation is determined by the market and industry.  Ideal may 
also mean prioritisation given to primary stakeholders’ demands (Clarkson, 1995; Harrison et al., 
2010). In particular, management may allocate resources to and prioritise the demands of  salient 
stakeholders over others.  Salience, in Mitchell et al. (1997), depends on three elements: urgency 
of claim/need, legitimacy of claim, and power of stakeholder.  The higher the salience of a 
stakeholder to a decision-maker at a particular time, the higher the level of priority given to the 
demands and needs of that stakeholder (Magness, 2008).  I argue that corporate allocation and 
supply of CSR resources is contingent on the level of salience of respective stakeholders.  In the 
particular context of this paper, I differentiate between employee-oriented and non-employee-
oriented CSR by focusing on the salience of the employee stakeholder.  
2.1  Union power and employee-oriented CSR
 On the demand side of CSR, employees can be classified as primary stakeholders 
(Clarkson, 1995).  Michell et al. (1997) classify employees as dependent stakeholders.  In other 
words, this stakeholder group has both legitimate needs and urgent needs from management. 
However, when these employees are unionised, I argue that they gain from the power of the 
union and, therefore, unionised employees become definitely salient stakeholders.  The union 
literature offers clear insights about this.  Unions represent a collective voice of employees 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984).  This model suggests ‘positive voice effects’ such that if unions 
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voice their members’ concerns via the collective bargaining process, this will bring the issues to 
the attention of management, which will then respond by making some necessary concessions 
in favour of employees. Such concessions or positive changes have been reported in the literature 
on job quality where unions’ voice acted as a positive catalyst for change (e.g. Wood, 2008; 
Hoque et al., 2017). Under the voice model, another way of contemplating positive voice effects 
is through unions’ monitoring and reporting role. When a company adopts a CSR practice that is 
employee-oriented, the union can monitor and report on the successful or unsuccessful 
implementation of this practice, i.e. the union can use its voice to hold the company to account. 
However, whether or not the expression of collective voice is heard by and acted upon by 
management largely depends on the union’s bargaining strength. In a liberal market economy 
such as the UK where unions are not protected via co-determination laws, for example, the ability 
of unions to successfully plead their case to management depends on the power of these unions 
(Guest and Conway, 2004).   Union power can be a complex construct, but at firm level, power 
has generally been proxied by union density (e.g. Barth et al., 2017).  Union decline (in power) 
has also been proxied by falling union densities (see Crouch, 2017).  The higher the power of the 
unions, the more they can generate positive voice effects. In the context of CSR, this would be 
akin to union power positively influencing  employee-oriented CSR. 
Hypothesis 1.  At higher levels of union density, companies develop more employee-
oriented policies and programs of CSR 
2.2 Union power and non-employee-oriented CSR
How does one analyze the relationship between unions and non-employee-oriented CSR? 
A convenient place to start is to consider how European unions view CSR in general. In some 
major European economies, the industrial relations system is such that unions are heavily 
institutionalized (and protected) within the system. Research by Preuss et al. (2006) suggests five 
possible union responses to CSR, with most of the unions citing CSR as a threat since it transfers 
more power and discretion to managers. One of five possibilities that is discussed is that CSR is 
only a method to improving corporate image (to external stakeholders) while diverting attention 
away from other less popular actions (typically towards internal stakeholders such as 
employees). Overall, across Europe Preuss et al. (2006) finds that unsurprisingly unions 
emphasize the  employee-oriented actions of CSR more than the external actions. Unions, for 
example, emphasize improved work-life balance, better child care facilities, flexible working 
arrangements. However, unions are less interested in non-employee-related elements. Few 
unions in the research by Preuss et al. (2006) mention corporate community involvement, and 
even fewer unions are interested in the preservation of the natural environment. 
In Britain, the interviews of union officials on CSR quoted in Gold et al. (2015) can shed 
some light on the perception of CSR by unions in the UK. Three points came from those 
interviews. First, unions are of the opinion that companies have broadened their scope of CSR by 
focusing not only on philanthropic activities but also by engaging more directly with multiple 
stakeholders in order to foster better management-stakeholder relationships. Second, unions 
consider CSR-branded domestic labour practices as part of their bargaining agenda rather than 
CSR conducted by the company. In other words, they take ownership of the good domestic 
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practices enacted by companies through their own bargaining power. CSR, on the other hand, 
refers mostly to compliance with international conventions and regulations in the company’s 
dealings with NGOs such as the fair trade movement. Third, some unions are still sceptical of CSR: 
they point out that companies can voluntarily choose their own CSR agenda and may focus on 
anti-corruption rather than labour standards. The possibility of cherry-picking by companies 
seems to be a source of high scepticism about union leaders. At the same time, unions may 
sometimes use CSR as a “marketing” technique to gain some leverage with management. For 
example, one of the unions interviewed in Gold et al. (2015) campaigned against the relocation 
of a plant purely on environmental ground (and not on the grounds of labour practices). In other 
words, while unions are sceptical of CSR, they are also using the CSR tools to defend their own 
interests in pragmatic fashion (appealing to external stakeholders’ interests) in the UK. 
To theorize the relationship between unions and non-employee-oriented CSR, I will draw 
from the union monopoly model.  The monopoly theory of labour unions (e.g. Reynolds, 1981; 
Oswald, 1985) posits that union decision makers will negotiate wage rates (and other benefits) 
which maximise the monetary surplus above the supply price of labour and hence raise costs for 
the company.  If unions perceive that companies have limited resources devoted to CSR (Gomez 
and Verma, 2012), the monopoly model suggests that powerful unions will extract maximum rent 
for their members (employee-oriented CSR) leaving companies with fewer resources for non-
employee-oriented CSR.  A substitution of non-employee-oriented with employee-oriented CSR 
is expected (Matten and Moon, 2008).  
However, the institutional peculiarity of the UK industrial relations system merits further 
analysis of the aforementioned.  In a country where unions are free to organise but where neither 
collective bargaining nor unionization is entrenched, what role do external constituents play in a 
particular union’s utility function?  Are external constituents perceived as competitors for 
company resources or can they be collaborators in pursuing common interests?  In Sweden, 
where collective bargaining is broader and union density significantly higher than the UK, 
collaboration between unions and NGOs interested in supply chains and labour rights has been 
successful despite difficulties (Egels-Zanden and Hyllman, 2011). In the UK, interviews by Gold et 
al. (2015) also suggest that unions are able to explicitly further the causes of environmental NGOs 
while implicitly protecting their members’ rights by campaigning against the relocation of some 
manufacturing plants on environmental grounds.  Some unions have perhaps realised that 
mutual gains between external constituents (particularly supply chains and NGOs) and union 
members are possible.  Wright (2011) exemplifies how some unions in the UK are putting 
pressure on client firms in their own employers’ value chains in order to raise labour standards 
and improve labour practices in the client firms.  In other words, unions are not only bargaining 
with their own employers but they are also going beyond in the value chain.  Some UK unions 
seem to be working with external constituents for a variety of good reasons.  However, while this 
complementarity (Gjolberg, 2009) can happen across the board in Sweden given the spread and 
socio-political dimension of unionization, the same cannot be said about the UK.  Not all unions 
are the same and not all have the same power and same breadth of operation.  Importantly, 
given the interviews from Gold et al. (2015), we do not know whether the needs of external 
constituents are even important to unions.  That is, we do not know whether and to what extent 
the utility function of unions is dependent on the needs of external constituents.  
At first glance, if we are to restrict ourselves to union power, without any recognition of 
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the utility function of specfic unions and their differential relationships to various management 
bodies, then we can posit a curvilinear relationship such that at low levels of power (union 
density), unions do not influence non-employee-oriented CSR, whereas as higher levels of power 
(union density), unions can influence non-employee oriented CSR.  The direction of influence is, 
however, ambiguous.  According to the union monopoly model, unions will extract maximum 
rent for their members and leave fewer slack resources for management to devote to external 
stakeholders.  Hence, we expect a substitution from non-employee-oriented CSR to employee-
oriented CSR.  However, it is also possible that powerful unions see a bigger picture such that 
external stakeholders are important to them and become an agent of positive change, as 
aforementioned with the union-NGO partnerships.  In such cases, unions will induce 
management to complement employee-oriented with non-employee-oriented CSR.  In general, 
therefore, the relationship between union power and non-employee-oriented CSR is neutral, 
similar to posited relationships in the CSR-financial performance link (e.g. Lee et al., 2018; 
McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Surroca et al, 2010).  There can exist a trade-off such that there can 
be 1) competition for slack resources, giving rise to a substitution effect, or 2) mutual rent-sharing 
giving rise to complementarity between employee-oriented and non-employee-oriented CSR.  
Hypothesis 2  The relationship between union density and non-employee-oriented CSR is 
neutral. 
3  Empirical Methodology
 
3.1  Sample and data collection
 The sample is constructed from a number of databases. The CSR data for this study were 
provided directly by SustainAlytics, a global leader in sustainability reporting and Environment-
Social-Governance (ESG) metrics. The primary objective of SustainAlytics, it should be noted, is 
to provide reliable and comparable information to investors who want to integrate ethical and 
other social issues into their investment strategy and portfolio. For example, pension funds are 
often mandated to include CSR in their due diligence process of portfolio decisions. Analysts 
working for SustainAlytics collect raw data from company reports and other third-party reports 
(e.g. unions, NGOs, government and Stock Exchange documents) and standardize them into 
consistent units so that they can arrive at final scores that are comparable across companies. 
Usually, these scores are at three levels: 1) Environmental, 2) Social, and 3) Governance, and each 
firm is scored and ranked on a monthly basis relative to a comparable peer group. For example, 
oil and gas companies would typically be lower in terms of their environment score, as a result 
of which they cannot be compared to banks and other financial institutions. Rather, 
SustainAlytics analysts rank companies on a peer-group basis, where companies in similar 
‘baskets’ of ESG are pooled together. This idiosyncracy is not a problem for this paper because I 
will be using SustainAlytics’ raw scores and industry controls to create my own measures. 
 ESG data is divided into its three components and each component is then further 
subdivided into several subcomponents (see Appendix Figure A 1 for the categories employed by 
SustainAlytics). For the purpose of this study, I will focus only on the social theme, and its three 
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subcomponents because it is not clear which aspects of governance and environment apply more 
to employees or to external stakeholders. The theoretical approach in Hawn and Iaonnou (2016) 
is mostly based on neo-institutional theory and they do consider some aspects such as 
“percentage of women on the Board of Directors” as internal CSR. However, given that this paper 
is looking at CSR from the perspective of stakeholders who benefit from such CSR, I cannot do 
that. Percentage of women on the Board of Directors may be appealing to internal stakeholders 
such as management and labour, but it may also be appealing to investors and potential investors 
who may view women as more ethical in their business conduct. Similarly, programs to reduce 
water and energy usage is viewed as an aspect of internal CSR in Hawn and Iaonnou, 2016, which 
may be of interest to employee morale, but it may be of more interest to environmental 
stakeholders, the media, and other external stakeholders including “green” investors. In other 
words, I take the view that governance and environment are noisier measures of my constructs 
of employee-oriented and non-employee-oriented CSR.  However, the social element is clearer 
given that SustainAlytics can delineate between CSR that affects employees (internal 
stakeholders), and suppliers, clients and the community (external stakeholders).i Employee-
oriented CSR will, therefore, consist of elements of CSR that fall under the topic ‘employees’, 
whereas non-employee-oriented CSR will comprise of CSR elements that pertain to suppliers, 
clients, and society, local communities and philanthropy. To give a couple of examples, under 
employee-oriented CSR, items such as policies with regards to health and safety, work-life 
balance are considered. For non-employee-oriented, items such as policy on certifying suppliers, 
programs to increase purchase of  fair-trade materials, community engagement programs are 
used. A full set of variables is listed in Appendix Table A 1. Each item is scored out of 100, whereby 
best performance is 100, next best would be 75 or 50, and so on until the company scores 0 for 
an item where it fails considerably. In total, the data contains 14 items that make up the 
employee-oriented CSR score (15 - 1(degree of unionisation)), and 43 items that make up the 
non-employee-oriented CSR score. Degree of unionization is left out and is used separately as an 
explanatory variable. Table 1 gives an overview of the ESG data.
Financial data are obtained from Thomson Reuters DataStream database. In particular, the items 
used are size (log of revenue), profitability (return on equity), opportunistic value or potential of 
the firm (calculated as Tobin’s Q), liquidity position (calculated as quick ratio). The final sample is 
an unbalanced panel with 98 unique firms from the FTSE100 resulting in 1,204 firm-quarter 
observations from the fourth quarter of 2009 to the fourth quarter of 2013. Note that the independent 
variables will be lagged by 1 quarter.  Financial data were obtained on a monthly basis and then 
collapsed to a quarterly basis, starting from the third quarter of 2009.  
3.2  Dependent variables
 Both of the CSR scores are obtained by first totalling the scores for all of their respective 
items, and this is done for each company  at time . Note that SustainAlytics usually uses a 𝑖 𝑡
proprietary weighting standard to score and rank companies contingent on industry (or peer 
group) belonging. However, I will not use this approach for this study because I have no method 
to validate or invalidate their proprietary weighting standard. Instead each item that forms the 
employee-oriented CSR score and each item that forms the non-employee-oriented CSR score 
will be assigned equal weight. This follows the convention in the literature from Waddock and 
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Graves (1997), Hillman and Keim (2001) and Iaonnou and Serafeim (2012).  Nonetheless, the 
scores may still be heavily tilted in terms of industry dependence (e.g. certain industries may 
have more supply chain monitoring issues in general), and therefore, relative standardized scores 
of each company  at time  are then calculated for each of employee-oriented and non-𝑖 𝑡




where CSR refers to any one ofemployee-oriented (EMP) or non-employee-oriented (NON)CSR 
score. This method also allows to bound the measures between 0 and 1, and make 
interpretations more standard, as per Baron (2009). Appendix Table A 2 shows the various CSR 
scores by industry. 
3.3  Independent variables
 With regards to independent variables, union density, as provided by SustainAlytics is 
used. Some companies have zero unions and, therefore, zero union density. One of the questions 
that may be posed is whether union density represents the best understanding of union voice 
and union power. The simple answer is yes as this has been used in prior research (see Hoque et 
al., 2017) and higher union densities do indicate a heavier presence of unions that act as a more 
powerful voice mechanism for employees. However, if better data was available (at firm and not 
only at plant level), a more complex measure of union power and voice would have included on-
site representation of union representatives (e.g. Hoque et al., 2017), union affiliation with 
national and international labour organisations etc. At plant level, this data does not exist but 
may be tediously constructed. Constructing such a dataset at company-level can prove to be 
largely inaccurate because data at plant level would need to be aggregated and weighted. As 
such, I use union density at company-level as the best available proxy for union power and voice. 
With regards to firm size, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is applied to total revenue given 
large variations in the data and given that some companies report negative revenues as allowed 
by international financial reporting standards (IFRS)ii, while the other variables (Return on Equity, 
Quick Ratio, and Tobin’s Q) are kept the same. 
3.4  Econometric specification
 With the unbalanced panel of 98 firms observed over 17 quarters and to test the 
aforementioned hypotheses, I adapt a specification that has been used in the CSR literature by 
Baron (2009) and Iaonnou and Serafeim (2014). Equation 2 gives the specification that will be 
used in this analysis. 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽2ln𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 ― 1 +
(2)𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽6𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 ― 1𝜀𝑖𝑡
where  can be either Relative employee-oriented or Relative non-employee-𝑅𝑒𝑙𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
oriented CSR score of company  at time .iii. Equation 2 is estimated using the fixed effects 𝑖 𝑡
methodology, as a result of which industry controls are not used. Random effects were used as 
a check but a Hausmann test suggested that fixed effects estimation will produce more consistent 
results (p-value of test around 0.004). 
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4  Results
 Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables of interest (employee-oriented CSR, 
non-employee-oriented CSR, and union density) as well as for the control variables (quick ratio, 
Tobin’s Q, total revenue, and return on equity). Note that I also show the weighted scores 
(environment, social, governance, total) provided by SustainAlytics.   I divide their scores by 100 
to make comparisons easy with my internal and external CSR scores which are bounded between 
0 and 1.  The means, standard deviations, minimums and maximums are shown both across firms 
and within firms. The summary statistics reveal that there is quite a large variation in the data, 
whether it be the scores provided by SustainAlytics, or my calculated CSR scores. The same 
observation holds for the independent variables as well. Overall, most of the variation happens 
across firms rather than within firms. However, the variations within are substantial enough to 
warrant the use of fixed effect modelling. Note that out of the 98 companies, 38 firms 
experienced some changes in their levels of union density over the study period. 60 companies 
experienced no change, out of which 40 were non-unionized companies altogether. The results 
that follow will control for these variations by clustering standard errors at the firm level. Note 
that calculating standard errors for 98 clusters greatly reduces the degrees of freedom of the 
models and reduces the significance of many variables. Separate results (not shown) using 
White’s method of controlling for heteroskedasticity show qualitatively similar results but the 
levels of significance of some variables are higher. 
 A good indication for the regression results would be to compare the CSR profile of 
companies with no unions against companies with varying levels of union density. To achieve 
this, I cluster companies into several bins: first bin contains companies that have zero unions 
throughout the period of study; second bin contains companies that had low levels of 
unionization throughout (above 0 but below 0.3); third bin contains companies with medium 
levels of unionization (between 0.3 and 0.5); fourth bin has firms with union levels between 0.5 
and 0.7; fifth bin contains companies with union levels above 0.7. Figure 1 depicts this summary 
statistic. As can be seen, higher levels of union density seems to be associated with higher levels 
of CSR in general, both employee-oriented and non-employee-oriented. However, there are 
some indications regarding the choice between both types of CSR. At low levels of union density, 
employee-oriented CSR dominates non-employee-oriented CSR, while at high levels of union 
density, non-employee-oriented CSR is higher than employee-oriented CSR. This summary 
statistic is counter-intuitive to the union monopoly model, which would have predicted that 
unions extract maximum rent for their members at the expense of other stakeholders. However, 
these are plainly summary statistics and a deeper analysis will follow with the fixed effects model. 
 Table 3 shows the pairwise correlations between the variables of interest. Significance 
levels are not shown but one observation about union density and company measures is that 
unions tend to organize more in larger firms, as measured by log of revenue. Also, and this goes 
in line with Metcalf (2003), unions overall are associated with under-performing firms, as 
measured by both the Tobin’s Q and Return on Equity. However, with regards to CSR, they do 
seem to be associated with more socially responsible firms, across all dimensions and measures 
used. Interestingly, the correlation between unions and employee-oriented CSR is much higher 
than the correlation between unions and non-employee-oriented CSR.  
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Table 4 presents the main regression results of estimating the employee-oriented CSR 
scores with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Model 1 represents a basic model without 
the main independent variable of interest: union density. Return on Equity in period  is 𝑡 ―1
negatively correlated with employee-oriented CSR in period . This is an interesting finding, 𝑡
implying that companies that financially do poorly in a certain period will increase the quality of 
their employee-oriented policies and programs in the next period. This is akin to the “damage 
mitigation” hypothesis posited by Gomez and Verma (2012). Model 2 adds a linear measure of 
union density, and we find that the previous observations remain  and that union density in 
period  is positively related to employee-oriented CSR. A 1 standard deviation increase in 𝑡 ―1
union density is associated with a 0.05 (obtained by multiplying the coefficient with the standard 
deviation of union density in Table 1) standard deviation increase in employee-oriented CSR.  
Hypothesis 1 is, therefore, sustained.  Model 3 also adds the square term of union density in 
order to capture non-linear trends of internal policies and programs as a function of union 
density. Results show that there is no non-linear trend. In specifications that use White’s method 
of controlling for heteroskedasticity instead of firm-level clustering of standard errors, the non-
linearity is sustained even though the coefficient on the quadratic term is negative, implying 
slower rate of expansion of internal programs and policies as union density rises.   
Table 5 presents the main regression results of estimating the non-employee-oriented 
CSR scores with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Model 1 again represents a basic 
model without the main independent variable of interest: union density. The results show that 
Return on Equity in period  is positively correlated with non-employee-oriented CSR in 𝑡 ―1
period , going against the “damage mitigation” hypothesis posited by Gomez and Verma (2012). 𝑡
Firms work more with suppliers, clients, and the community when they perform better in the 
previous period. This result stands in contrast to the result that is obtained when employee-
oriented CSR is considered. Different corporate approaches to CSR seem to be working here. 
When financial results are bad in a certain period, firms invest more in employee-oriented CSR 
and less in non-employee-oriented CSR in the next period. Perhaps, British firms view CSR as a 
morale and productivity-boosting endeavour. The fact that liquidity position and size and 
opportunistic value of the firm are not correlated with non-employee-oriented CSR in a 
significant manner also adds credence to the idea that (non-employee-oriented) CSR is perhaps 
a marketing tool employed to improve performance, rather than reflect past performance (the 
insurance hypothesis in Gomez and Verma, 2012). Model 2 adds a linear measure of union 
density, and results show that union density in period  has no significant relationship to non-𝑡 ―1
employee-oriented CSR in period . Model 3, however, shows that there is a very high non-𝑡
linearity in the relationship between union density and non-employee-oriented CSR. The linear 
effect of unions on non-employee-oriented CSR is negative, implying that there is a substitution 
effect that takes place. With unions, companies invest less in non-employee-oriented CSR, 
perhaps because they have to devote more resources to internal policies and programs.. 
However, this substitution is not binding. The high positive on the square term suggests that 
substitution ends after some degree of unionisation, and in fact the trend reverses such that both 
components of CSR go hand-in-hand. In other words, results show that there is both a 
substitution effect (Matten and Moon, 2008) and a complement effect (Gjolberg, 2009) between 
employee-oriented and non-employee-oriented CSR.     
Given the above findings, a further relationship merits attention: the relationship 
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between union density and the difference between the two types of CSR.   Table 6 shows the 
results where the dependent variables are ‘employee-oriented MINUS non-employee-oriented’ 
scores. This new variable has mean -0.045, standard deviation of 0.398 and given the 
standardisation method ranges from -1 to 1.  On average, firms have higher external CSR than 
internal CSR, though it must be noted that the standard deviation is quite high. The three models 
follow the same procedure as before, with unionization entering in phases. Model 2 suggests a 
positive relationship between unionization and the difference between the two scores, although 
the result is statistically insignificant. When union density is entered in as a square term, the 
results show that the difference increases with union density but only up to a point, after which 
the reverse happens. Non-employee-oriented CSR picks up more pace so that the difference 
progressively becomes smaller as union density rises.  Interpreting these results with non-linear 
terms is easier with post-regression graphs of the marginal effects of increasing union density, as 
depicted in Figures 2 and 3.  
As can be seen from Figure 2, employee-oriented CSR scores rise with union density but 
at a diminishing rate. Statistically, given the conservative methods used for estimating standard 
errors, the observed non-linear effects are not significant. With regards to non-employee-
oriented CSR scores shown on the right panel, we note these scores initially fall as union density 
starts to pick up, but after about 40% union density, the trend is reverse. Non-employee-oriented 
CSR picks up rather significantly. With regards to the difference between the two types of 
CSR,Figure 3 leads to some interesting observations. First, the post-regression estimates, holding 
all else at their means, show that below 10% unionization, companies invest more in non-
employee-oriented rather than employee-oriented policies and programs. Beyond 10% of union 
density, the trend changes and companies score higher on employee-oriented rather than non-
employee-oriented CSR.   
A further observation is that there are both substitution and complement effects between 
the two measures. Companies substitute non-employee-oriented CSR with employee-oriented 
CSR up to union density levels of approximately 60%. The upward trend means that the difference 
between employee-oriented and non-employee-oriented CSR keeps growing as a function of 
union density, albeit at a diminishing rate. After 60% unionisation, both types of CSR work in 
tandem. They complement each other, and from Figure 2, we can attribute this to a sharp 
improvement in external policies and programs. As such, the difference between the two 
measures falls.   
4.1  Robustness checks
One of the interpretative concerns of the above results is that union density within firms 
can change because of two factors, given that union density is measured as the ratio of unionized 
employees to total number of employees. If we consider specifically the case where union density 
is rising within firms, there could be two broad reasons for this. First, unions may be getting better 
at organizing within firms over time. Second, firms may be shrinking in size and total 
employment, where presumably non-union employees are being laid off rather than union 
employees, who are generally better protected (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). As such, union 
density rising may not necessarily mean that unions are getting better at organizing and at 
(directly) influencing employee-oriented CSR, and the difference between employee-oriented 
and non-employee-oriented CSR. It may be the case that the company is shrinking in size, as a 
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result of which union density is going up. To consider this aspect, I estimate equation 2 and add 
the difference in firm size between times  and  as an independent variable. Size is here 𝑡 ― 1 𝑡 ―2
measured by log of revenue since it is more correlated with total number of employees at the 
firm level.iv This will help control for firm size variations over time. If results are consistent with 
the earlier reported main estimations, then the interpretation can be that union density is more 
closely measuring unions’ ability to organize and influence the CSR profile of companies. Table 7 
reports the results when difference in size is considered. Models 1 and 2 report results for 
employee-oriented CSR, with union density entering as a linear term only in Model 1 and as a 
quadratic term in Model 2. The same exposition is done for non-employee-oriented CSR (Models 
3 and 4), and difference between both scores (Models 5 and 6).   
A comparison between the estimates in Table 7 and the earlier estimates in Tables 4, 5, 
and 6 show that the earlier results are robust to the inclusion of size difference within firms. The 
union density effects have not changed much, both in terms of economic as well as statistical 
significance. Union influence on employee-oriented and non-employee-oriented CSR seems to 
be occurring because unions are better at organizing and/or better at driving corporate policy. 
5  Discussion and Conclusions
 In order to gain a better understanding of the stakeholder approach to CSR, it is critical 
to investigate CSR as a good. On the one hand, who demands CSR, and on the other hand, how 
much CSR can be supplied by a company? This paper uses the stakeholder approach (Freeman, 
1984) and a resource allocation approach based on slack resources theoryto investigate how 
unions wielding their power, urgency, and legitimacy as stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997) can 
affect the CSR profile of companies where their members work. 
 In this endeavour, this paper has attempted to bridge a gap between two streams in the 
CSR literature. As Bluhm and Trappmann (2012) point out, Matten and Moon (2008) propose that 
there is a substitution effect between “implicit” CSR and “explicit” CSR, whereby some firms 
generally devote more attention to following rules and regulations and maintain their image as 
such, while other firms are more explicit in their CSR practices, often with community and other 
social programs that reach a broader range of stakeholders. Similarly, Gomez and Verma (2012) 
and Hawn and Iaonnou (2016) point that CSR is costly and companies do not actually do both 
internal and external CSR concurrently and at the same rate. The flip side comes from Bluhm and 
Trappmann (2012) and Gjolberg (2009) who argue that in certain countries, internal and external 
CSR are actually complements, and both serve to reinforce each other. The findings of this paper, 
which uses more detailed data and analyses companies rather than country-wide averages 
mostly used in cross-country comparisons of CSR, show that both elements of substitution and 
complementarity are at work. A result that is interesting and may be analogous to the threshold 
effects of union density on wages (Hamermesh, 1970) where union density needs to reach certain 
thresholds to have a certain effect on wage bargaining. What this paper finds is that at very low 
levels of unionization, companies do more non-employee-oriented than employee-oriented CSR, 
catering to the needs of outside stakeholders more than internal stakeholders. Then, after 
approximately 10% unionization rate, companies start substituting external with internal policies 
and programs and this substitution goes on, albeit at a diminishing rate. However, the trend 
reverses after unionization reaches approximately 60%. Non-employee-oriented CSR gathers 
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pace and work more as a complement to employee-oriented CSR such that the difference 
between the two narrows. 
 How can we explain these interesting results? Literature from labour relations other than 
union voice and monopoly models may help explain why we see the aforementioned results. 
First, Metcalf (2003) points out that unions in the UK and USA have been shown to reduce 
investment in physical capital but increase investment in human capital. This aspect of increasing 
investment in human capital may extend to the CSR sphere but not necessarily in a narrow sense. 
It is possible that part of collective agreements and union pressure incentivises or forces 
companies to invest in human capital inside but also outside the firm, through educational grants, 
health care grants, and other donations to the community (external stakeholders). This could be 
an explanation that could help understand why non-employee-oriented CSR goes up after 
approximately 40 % unionization rate. Unions could achieve this through negotiations but also 
through their role of monitoring work. For example, Pencavel (1977) emphasizes the role that 
unions may play in overseeing work performance given that they are in a position of high power 
and have been allowed to disseminate work payments to workers. A trust-based relationship 
between management and labour could be at the core of why we see high non-employee-
oriented CSR when union density goes up.  It is possible that unions, when entrenced and quite 
powerful, bargain not only for the direct interests of their members but also for the larger 
community.  In other words, non-employee-oriented CSR would be part of their utility function 
and union leaders could be bargaining along broader lines than previously thought (Clark and 
Oswald, 1993).  This is interesting in the UK context and does mimic some of the findings from 
Scandinavian countries where overall unions are more entrenched (Gjolberg, 2009; Egels-Zanden 
and Hyllman, 2011).
At low levels of unionization, management may have to deal with the shock factor of 
having to deal with unions while maintaining fairness across the board. Slichter et al. (1960) and 
Metcalf (2003) term this the shock effect of unionization. In the context of this paper, this refers 
to management initially “sacrificing” non-employee-oriented CSR at lower levels of unionization. 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) proposes that managerial responses to unionism take the form of 
more rational personnel policies such as lean production techniques and more careful monitoring 
of work, which reduces organizational slack. As such, it is possible that more rational personnel 
policies are leaving resources on the table, which the company is shielding from unions and giving 
to external stakeholders in the guise of external policies and programs. As unions gain power in 
these companies, they slowly but surely seek out these slack resources in their favour and against 
the interests of external stakeholders.  These would explain why we initially see a substitution 
effect between employee-oriented and non-employee-oriented CSR.  
Despite these results, there is an inherent issue with the measurement of the 
independent variable.  Union density does not measure union power and voice fully.  More 
importantly, union density does not indicate where the interests (utility) of the union lies.  While 
the (average) effects of union density on employee-oriented and non-employee-oriented CSR are 
statistically and economically robust in this analysis, questions about different unions’ utility 
functions still remain.  For example, two unions that have the same density in two companies 
might have different utility functions.  More research is warranted on knowing how union density 
is linked to union policies on non-employee-oriented CSR in particular.  Nevertheless, this paper 
is the first to the author’s knowledge to explore a link between a measure of union 
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power/demands and corporate supply of CSR.  The effects found in the paper pose some 
questions about union organising strategies and breadth of influence, as well as management 
responses to union demands.  Unions, it seems, do not prize away slack resources for their 
members at the expense of external stakeholders.  Mutual interests between management and 
densely-organised unions are possible even in a British context characterised by conflictual 
union-management relationships.  The threshold points found in this paper also contributes to 
the threshold effects of union density on outcomes other than employee wages.  Apart from the 
contribution to the literature, this paper has implications on union tactics and management 
implications. Below 10% union density, unions do not seem able to increase the company’s CSR 
activities for the sake of employees, but between 10% to 60%, unions have more power to do so, 
and they do.   When union density is higher than 60%, unions will consider non-employee-
oriented CSR as a complement to employee-oriented CSR.  Therefore, rather than curtailing 
unions, perhaps management should focus on finding grounds for common interests.
 
 In conclusion, this paper has demonstrated that unions using their voice and power can 
influence a company’s CSR profile. The results indicate that companies which are subjected to 
rising union densities but still have low levels of union density initially have to substitute non-
employee-oriented with employee-oriented CSR. While the data cannot ascertain the reasons for 
this, from a theoretical point of view, this can be deemed as a ’shock effect’ of dealing with 
unions. At higher levels of union density, companies seem to be able to complement both types 
of CSR. There is perhaps a reinforcement of mutual interests between management and unions. 
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Table 1: Description of data used




Social: the social 
theme measures 
how a company 
is performing in 












These are not 















CSR only consists of 
company policies 
towards employees.  
Items scored out of 
100 include (non-
exhaustive):
















10 more items are 
listed in Online 
Appendix Table A 1.  
Note that union 
density is not used as 
an item in calculating 
employee-oriented 




Oriented CSR consists 






philanthopy.  Items 
scored out of 100 
include (non-
exhaustive):
1) Supply chain 
monitoring 
system
2) Supply chain 
audits
3) External social 
certification of 
suppliers
















of net earnings 
before taxes
36 more items are 
listed in Online 
Appendix Table A 1.
Page 21 of 31 British Journal of Industrial Relations
22
Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Variation Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Total Score overall  0.519  0.358  0.000  1.000 
between   0.331  0.000  1.000 
within   0.172  -0.364  1.166 
     
Environment 
Score 
overall  0.526  0.349  0.000  1.000 
between   0.318  0.000  1.000 
within   0.182  -0.359  1.173 
     
Social Score overall  0.506  0.358  0.000  1.000 
between   0.334  0.000  1.000 
within   0.168  -0.326  1.182 
     
Governance 
Score 
overall  0.504  0.359  0.000  1.000 
between   0.318  0.000  1.000 
within   0.196  -0.341  1.239 
     
Employee-
Oriented Score 
overall  0.428  0.370  0.000  1.000 
 
between 
  0.333  0.000  1.000 
within   0.192  -0.305  1.250 




overall  0.415  0.351  0.000  1.000 
between   0.303  0.000  1.000 
within   0.186  -0.467  1.194 
     
Quick Ratio overall  0.409  1.399  0.000 21.195 
between   1.044  0.000  9.140 
within   0.876  -8.638 12.464 
     
Tobin’s Q overall  1.599  0.949  0.547  9.949 
between   1.300  0.678  9.949 
within   0.261  0.407  3.302 
     
Total Revenue   
(£ millions) 
overall 12.958 25.763 -5.929 242.990 
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between 23.214 0.005 209.485 
within 4.424 -54.379 46.463
     
Return on 
Equity (%) 
overall 33.889 266.250 -131.290 7206.450 
between 128.221 -131.290 1365.863 
within 231.882 -1195.704 5874.476 
     
Union Density overall  0.178  0.265  0.000  1.000 
 
between 
  0.229  0.000  1.000 
within   0.121  -0.347  0.693 
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Total Score 1   
Environment 
Score
0.825*** 1   
Social Score 0.809*** 0.554*** 1   
Governance 
Score
0.649*** 0.442*** 0.412*** 1   
EMP CSR 0.558*** 0.346*** 0.615*** 0.410*** 1   
NON CSR 0.549*** 0.389*** 0.601*** 0.402*** 0.393*** 1   
Quick Ratio 0.0396 0.0249 0.0746 -0.00501** 0.0272* 0.0243 1   





0.0470** 0.00341 0.196*** -0.0570** -0.104*** 1  
Return on 
Equity 
-0.0139 0.00878 0.0115 -0.000599 -0.0459* 0.0238 0.00684 0.0490* -0.0333 1
Union 
density 
0.0722*** 0.0915*** 0.0109+ 0.100*** 0.191*** 0.0193 0.00683*** -0.157*** 0.238*** -0.0410* 1
Statistical significance denoted by: + p<0.10, * p<0.05,   ** p<0.01,   *** p<0.001
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Table 4: Fixed effects estimates of Employee-Oriented CSR score







Quick Ratio -0.0453 -0.0530 -0.0528
(0.0492) (0.0483) (0.0478)








-0.00119 ∗∗∗ -0.000562 -0.000484
(0.000220) (0.000366) (0.000683)






Constant 1.273+ 1.338* 1.334*
(0.649) (0.632) (0.625)
Observations 1204 1204 1204
 within 𝑅2 0.012 0.023 0.023
All independent variables are lagged by 1 quarter
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
 ,  ,   ,    + 𝑝 < 0.10  ∗ 𝑝 < 0.05  ∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.01  ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.001
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Quick Ratio -0.00158 -0.000365 -0.00278
(0.0546) (0.0549) (0.0526)








0.00461 ∗∗∗ 0.00451 ∗∗∗ 0.00358 ∗∗∗
(0.000488) (0.000581) (0.000769)






Constant 0.461 0.451 0.495
(0.692) (0.695) (0.667)
Observations 1204 1204 1204
 within𝑅2 0.009 0.009 0.027
All independent variables are lagged by 1 quarter 
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
 ,   ,   ,   + 𝑝 < 0.10  ∗ 𝑝 < 0.05  ∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.01  ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.001
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Table 6: Fixed effects estimates of the difference between Employee-Oriented and Non-
Employee-Oriented CSR scores

















Quick Ratio -0.0437   ∗ -0.0526 -0.0500 
(0.0603) (0.0616) (0.0563) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0191 -0.0191 -0.0120 
(0.0630) (0.0605) (0.0574) 
Size (Log 
Revenue)
-0.0472 -0.0542 -0.0535 
(0.0459) (0.0470) (0.0435) 
Return on 
Equity 
-0.00580   ∗∗∗ -0.00507   ∗∗∗ -0.00406   ∗∗∗
(0.000671) (0.000764) (0.00103) 




  -0.577   ∗
  (0.273) 
Constant 0.812 0.887 0.839 
(0.784) (0.791) (0.726) 
Observations 1204 1204 1204 
 within 𝑅2 0.010 0.019 0.030 
All independent variables are lagged by 1 quarter 
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
 ,  ,  ,   + 𝑝 < 0.10  ∗ 𝑝 < 0.05  ∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.01  ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.001
 
     
Page 27 of 31 British Journal of Industrial Relations
28
 Table 7: Fixed effects estimates of Employee-Oriented and Non-Employee-Oriented, when 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quick Ratio -0.0343 -0.0341 0.0249 0.0225 -0.0592 -0.0565
(0.0513) (0.0507) (0.0575) (0.0548) (0.0697) (0.0637)
Tobin’s Q -0.0560 -0.0555 -0.0368 -0.0432 -0.0192 -0.0123
(0.0534) (0.0526) (0.0301) (0.0297) (0.0606) (0.0574)
Size (Log 
Revenue)
-0.0397 -0.0397 0.0213 0.0212 -0.0610 -0.0608
(0.0394) (0.0391) (0.0439) (0.0426) (0.0543) (0.0506)
Return on 
Equity 
-0.00596 -0.000516 0.00448 ∗∗∗ 0.00353 ∗∗∗ -0.00507 ∗∗∗ -0.00404 ∗∗∗
(0.000371) (0.000701) (0.000579) (0.000774) (0.000766) (0.00104)
Union density 0.192 + 0.228 -0.0334 -0.457 + 0.225+ 0.684 ∗
(0.0943) (0.259) (0.105) (0.231) (0.119) (0.299)
Union density 
squared 
-0.0453 0.540 ∗ -0.586 ∗
(0.230) (0.241) (0.275)
Size at  𝑡 ― 1
MINUS size at 𝑡
 (Log ―2
Revenue)
-0.00009 -0.00005 -0.0012+ -0.000349 0.00114** 0.000346
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.000367) (0.000366)
Constant 1.156+ 1.153+ 0.156 0.192 1.000 0.961
(0.681) (0.674) (0.731) (0.704) (0.907) (0.837)
Observations 1204 1204 1204 1204 1204 1204
 within 𝑅2 0.021 0.021 0.011 0.030 0.018 0.030
All independent variables are lagged by 1 quarter 
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
 ,   ,  ,    + 𝑝 < 0.10  ∗ 𝑝 < 0.05  ∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.01  ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.001
i The summary statistics will nonetheless include the SustainAlytics measures of total, governance, social, and environment scores.
ii In other specifications, market capitalization and total assets are used as proxies for firm size.  The results are similar with regards to the 
influence of unions on CSR.
iii I also use the scores provided by SustainAlytics (i.e. Total, Environment, Social, Governance). Also, the weights used by SustainAlytics is 
proprietary and serves towards purposes of ranking companies: not an objective of this study.
iv Note that I do not have total number of employees in my dataset, which is why I am using the size proxy of log of revenue.
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Figure1: Employee-Oriented and Non-Employee-Oriented CSR score means, by various categorical levels of 
unionisationof union density 
139x101mm (300 x 300 DPI) 
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Figure 2: Estimated Employee-Oriented and Non-Employee-Oriented CSR scores, by union density 
139x101mm (300 x 300 DPI) 
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Figure 3: Estimated difference between Employee-Oriented and Non-Employee-Oriented CSR scores, by 
union density 
139x101mm (300 x 300 DPI) 
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